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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early spring of 1990, the state legislature dramatically
changed the juvenile delinquency provisions of The Florida Children's
Code.' The legislature also made changes, albeit more modest ones, in
the child welfare section of the Code.2 Florida's revenue shortfall,
which became apparent in the summer of 1990, produced an equally
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., Colgate
University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970. The author thanks Laurie
Briggs for her assistance in the preparation of this article. This survey article will cover
cases decided through September 30, 1991.
1. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-.516
(1989 & Supp. 1990). The legislature also passed the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. § 874 (Supp. 1990), and the Juve-
nile Delinquency and Gang Prevention Act of 1990, codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.025
(Supp. 1990).
2. See William and Budd Bell Prevention and Protection Act, codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.002 (Supp. 1990).
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dramatic reduction in appropriations of state funds central to the suc-
cess of these two amendments to the Code., The changes in Chapter 39
only have been in effect for a year' and the appellate courts are now
starting to interpret them. There is some evidence from these opinions
that the failure to provide programs and services to complement the
new juvenile delinquency and the child welfare laws is not lost on the
appellate courts.5 At the same time, they continue to admonish the trial
courts to pay attention to seemingly rudimentary statutory obligations
such as compliance with the Chapter 39 provisions concerning the
length of secure detention for alleged delinquents and articulation of
grounds for dependency findings.
As in past years, nearly all of the appellate decisions come from
the district courts of appeal. Some are pro forma opinions, but others
involve significant issues. In addition, this year the Florida Supreme
Court decided an extremely important case, Padgett v. HRS,6 which
cleared up a major conflict among the district courts of appeal concern-
ing the definition and application of prospective neglect.
This article will review the case law in both the child welfare and
juvenile justice areas of juvenile law since October, 1990." Appellate
decisions lacking significant issues will not be discussed. This survey is
again divided into two sections: juvenile delinquency and dependency. 8
3. Avido D. Khahaifa, Juvenile Law System Assailed, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 1991, at 7B.
4. The statute was enacted effective October 1, 1990.
5. See Interest of M.C., 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (writ of
habeas corpus will issue where juvenile is confined for more than statutory five-day
maximum while awaiting placement in commitment program).
6. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
7. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L.
REV. 1169 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Survey] (discussing cases decided through Sep-
tember 30, 1990).
8. Chapter 39 of the Florida statutes is divided into six sections. The provisions
relevant to the discussion here are Part II, governing juvenile delinquency, Part III,
governing dependency, and Part VI, governing termination of parental rights. Part VI
of Chapter 39 governs families in need of services and children in need of services.
Although the law was passed three years ago, research discloses no reported opinions
since that time on that section of the law.
[Vol. 16
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Issues of Right to Counsel and Confessions
The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1966 in Miranda v.
Arizona9 that persons apprehended by police officers are entitled to cer-
tain warnings with regard to constitutionally protected rights and, in
1967, in In re Gault* that juveniles have the right to counsel in delin-
quency proceedings. By statute, Florida has specified that a child is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of a delinquency
proceeding.' Two cases decided in the district courts of appeal this
past year involve application of Miranda standards in the context of
waiver of counsel and confessions by children.
The more significant of the two cases is W.M. v. State."2 In a per
curiarn decision with a vigorous dissent by Judge Farmer, the Fourth
District affirmed the delinquency adjudication of the child over his con-
tention that the trial court committed error by denying a motion to
suppress a statement the child gave to the police. The confession was
made by a ten-year-old boy with an IQ of sixty-nine or seventy who
had a learning disability and was placed in a special education pro-
gram. He had no prior record with the police and was held in police
custody for approximately six hours prior to confessing to a series of
burglaries.
The majority explained that it had difficulty with the concept that
a ten-year-old could ever understand, in the sense that an adult could,
the consequences of waiving his constitutional rights to both silence and
counsel and thereafter give a confession. 3 However, the majority did
not substitute its own conclusions for those of the trial court, which had
made substantial findings of fact." ' With all of the factual information
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (Supp. 1990); see W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1989 Survey of
Florida Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Survey] (discuss-
ing earlier cases on these subjects); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1988 Survey of
Florida Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159, 1165-66 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Survey]
(same).
12. 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
13. Id.
14. The appeals court described the trial court's findings in the following man-
ner. The police originally went to the child's home where they spoke with the grand-
mother. They asked to take the child to the police station and asked if the grandmother
wanted to go. She declined. The child was advised of his constitutional rights in the
police car by officers who were described as experienced in dealing with juveniles. The
Dale
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from below, the appellate court concluded it was not free, under the
applicable legal standards, to substitute its own conclusions for those of
the trial court. First, it noted that a confession is not involuntary
merely because the individual making it is a juvenile."5 Second, the
appellate court reasoned that the trial court must resolve the conflicts
of facts and make a decision based upon the totality of the circum-
stances which includes the child's age, intelligence, education, experi-
ence and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his state-
ment. Both of these propositions are correct statements of the law.
Then, without explanation, the majority decided that it could not over-
turn the "thoroughly reasoned" decision of the trial court. 6 Although
never stated, it appears the majority was refusing to conclude that the
factual determinations by the trial court were clearly erroneous. 17 The
dissent, on the other hand, would have done so. The dissent noted, for
example, that the facts showed one of the officers testified that he, the
police had told the grandmother the youngster would not be arrested that day. They
took him to the station and then advised him again of his rights without handcuffing
him. The youngster never asked for a lawyer. He was taken into the detective's office
where he was given a Coke and some candy. He was interviewed by one officer for
approximately a half hour with a second officer present. One of the officers had previ-
ously investigated a shop lifting charge involving the child and had advised the young-
ster of his rights at that time. The child then went with the detectives to the area where
the homes were allegedly broken into by the youngster. The child pointed out where the
burglaries were committed. After he was read his rights, the youngster confessed to
having committed the burglaries and was taken back to the station and ultimately re-
leased to his home. He was arrested the next day. On the way to the station, his rights
were again read to him and the child pointed out locations of other burglaries. Then
another detective spoke with the youngster on the second day and the child was given
his rights again. He said he understood, and they then talked further about the bur-
glary. The child never signed a waiver of rights card nor was any tape recording or
tape recording of any kind made of any of the interviews. Witnesses were then called at
the suppression hearing including the youngster's specific learning disability (SLD)
teacher, the child's guardian/grandmother who suffered from high blood pressure and
heart problems, the principal of the child's school, the officers and the youngster. The
child testified that the officers threatened to hang the child by his neck if he did not
show them the houses involved in the burglary and that he was frightened. The police
denied making the statement, although one officer could not remember.
Id. at 981-82.
15. Id. at 983 (citing T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (for example, the trial court chose to believe the police officers who testi-
fied that they did not threaten the child by hanging him by his neck if he refused to
confess).
[Vol. 16
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officer, could not remember making a threatening statement to hang
the boy by his neck, as alleged by the child, rather than denying the
statement was made. There was no explanation by the trial court why
it chose to believe the police officers rather than the child.
The dissent would have held, in the alternative, that under Fare v.
Michael C."6 and Arizona v. Fulminante,19 whether rights are know-
ingly and voluntarily waived, based upon the totality of the circum-
stances, is a legal question which the appeals court can answer. Ac-
cording to Judge Farmer, these cases allow him to add together the
factual information to determine as a matter of law whether the waiver
was voluntary. He would have concluded that even though there was no
single objective factor which suggested voluntariness, given that the
burden was on the state, the waiver was involuntary.
The dissent may have the better of the argument both legally and
factually. Both sides are correct in saying that the United States Su-
preme Court has unequivocally held in determining whether a waiver is
voluntary, that the court must decide whether the child understood
based upon the totality of the circumstances. However, that is a ques-
tion of law. Thus, the majority should have reviewed the trial court's
decision based upon the totality of circumstances test. Had it done so,
it would have found no facts that demonstrated the child understood
what a lawyer does, how he might go about obtaining a lawyer, that if
he were indigent he understood what a public defender would do, that
a public defender is also a lawyer, or that he had the mental acuity to
read and comprehend. To the extent there was any evidence showing
that the: child understood, it involved the police officers' conclusory
evaluation. But even there they did not comment on the child's
understanding.
The second case, Z.F.B. v. State2 0 contains a more narrow hold-
ing. The Third District Court of Appeal, in a per curiam opinion with a
dissent by Chief Judge Schwartz, upheld the voluntariness of a child's
confession after being advised of his Miranda rights. In Z.F.B., the
youngster was suspected of being involved in a series of burglaries. The
police went to the child's home and asked permission from his mother
to speak with him. The mother, who was terminally ill, gave permission
for the officers to talk with the boy outside her presence, also advising
the police that the child had a legal guardian. Before questioning him,
18. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
19. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
20. 573 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Dale
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the officers advised the boy of his Miranda rights. 1 The officers ob-
tained a statement from him in the home, but the statement was sup-
pressed by the trial court because of possible coercion when the police
officers offered to help the youngster.2 The child was then taken to the
police station where he was given written Miranda warnings. The
youngster then asked for a lawyer. While the child was in a holding
cell, the police officers telephoned the individual whom the mother indi-
cated was the child's legal guardian. That person arrived at the police
station, spoke with the child, and told an officer that the child wanted
to talk. It turned out this person was not the child's legal guardian. The
child again was given the written Miranda form which he read and
signed. He then gave a statement admitting participation in the crimes.
The trial court denied the child's motion to suppress the confession.
The appellate court upheld the trial court by finding sufficient evidence
of the child's ability to comprehend the meaning of the Miranda warn-
ings and to waive his rights and also that the waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made. 23 Judge Schwartz, in dissent, disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the child instituted contact with the police after
the request for the lawyer.24 In his view, unless the child himself initi-
ated further communication, the police could not reinstitute the
interrogation.25
A separate counsel-related issue that, oddly, continues to create
problems, concerns application of the Florida Supreme Court rule re-
quiring written consent by a child to employment of a certified law
student intern as a defense lawyer in a delinquency proceeding. 2' Such
a document must be filed and brought to the attention of the trial
judge.27 In the case of Interest of J.H.,28 the issue was whether the
child intelligently waived the right to have counsel present at certain
relevant hearings by executing an acknowledgement that a certified law
21. Id. at 1032.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1033 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
25. Z.F.B., 573 So. 2d at 1033 (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486
(1990)).
26. See also 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 863; 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at
1179-80 (discussing earlier cases).
27. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 11-1.2(d) (1987) (Rules Gov-
erning the Law School Civil and Criminal Practice Program).
28. 580 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
[Vol. 16
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student would represent him. 9 The court found problems with the writ-
ten form and the procedure. First, the document did not state that the
child had the right to have a supervising attorney personally present
even when required by the trial judge who determines the extent of the
intern's participation." Second, the child was not advised of the right
to assistance of a supervising attorney at the time she entered her plea.
Thus, according to the court, the child could not intelligently waive the
right to be represented by a lawyer.3'
B. Detention Issues
Florida's approach to the use of secure detention to hold children
taken into custody has fluctuated over the past decade.32 With the pas-
sage of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990, the grounds for hold-
ing a child in secure detention have been narrowed somewhat to moder-
ately limit the grounds for initially holding a child.
However, the 1990 amendments made no change in the part of the
statute which provides that a child may only be held in detention for
twenty-one days unless an adjudicatory hearing has started. 33 Over the
last three years, the appellate courts have regularly granted writs of
habeas corpus based upon the trial courts' violation of this rule.34 The
appellate courts' anger continued unabated most recently in B.G. v.
Fryer.3 5 'That case involved a series of four petitions claiming that chil-
dren had been held beyond twenty-one days prior to adjudicatory hear-
ings. 6 The defense raised by the Attorney General on behalf of the
29. Id. at 163.
30. Id. (citing RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule I I-1.2(a))(governing
the Law School Civil and Criminal Practice Program).
31. Id.
32. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7; Bennett A. Brummer & Steven D. Levine,
Incarcerating Children for Their Own Good: Florida's Pre-Trial Detention Practices
Revisited, 60 FLA. B.J. 17 (1986); Jack Levine, Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing
Rehabilitalion Back in Style, 8 NOVA L.J. 255, 260 (1984).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(b) (Supp. 1990). It provides that "[n]o child
shall be held in secure, or nonsecure, or home detention under a special detention order
for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced
by the court."
34. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1171-72.
35. 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (the individual respondent in
so many of these cases, Ron Fryer, is the superintendent of the Broward County Re-
gional Juvenile Detention Center).
36. Id. at 431.
Dale
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respondent judge in each case was that there was "good cause" to con-
tinue the child in detention. Good cause, according to the Attorney
General, was the court's thorough review of several documents includ-
ing the child's arrest report, a criminal information file, detention
screening form and an HRS computer printout showing the child's
prior involvement in the court system."7 The Fourth District Court of
Appeals rejected this argument as merely parroting the law. Citing a
lack of any competent evidence to support the conclusory claims of in-
complete investigation or unavailability of unidentified witnesses, the
appellate court granted the writs. The language of the court's decision
in B.G. demonstrates once again its frustration with the trial bench.
The appellate court described the trial court as having "clearly and
consistently misconstrued" the relevant portions of the Florida Juvenile
Justice Act and that to fail to grant the writ would constitute an "evis-
ceration" of the state's detention limitations statute.3 8
The court's anger may have peaked in P.H. v. Fryer.9 In that
case, also involving a writ of habeas corpus in which the child was held
in excess of twenty-one days, the state sought by motion to extend se-
cure detention on good cause grounds asserting that it was unable to
locate a witness. The appellate court found that the state did not show
that the victim or any witnesses were actually unavailable and, there-
fore, there was no good cause to extend the time of the child in secure
detention. The appellate court then granted the writ of habeas corpus.
It also relied upon the earlier holding in E.W. v. Brown,10 to the effect
that the good cause requirement for an extension beyond twenty-one
days is not related to the original basis for detaining the child, but
relates to the explanation for the delay in commencement of the adjudi-
catory hearing. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Judge Letts,
concurring in P.H., noted the following:
As a spate of decisions (in excess of 40) from this court over
the last year will confirm, Judge Lawrence L. Korda does not like
the statutory provisions on juvenile detention. Neither do I. How-
ever, as Gertrude Stein might put it, 'the law is the law, is the law.'
37. Id. at 432.
38. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.032(6)(b), (d) (1989) recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.047(4)(e)7 (1991)).
39. 570 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
40. 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also 1990 Survey, supra
note 7, at 1173 (discussing E.W.).
[Vol. 16
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Surely, of all people, judges must have respect for it.' 1
A separate issue concerning pre-trial secure detention was raised
in W.N. v. Fryer.'2 In that case, a child sought relief on the grounds
that the court continued his placement in secure detention in violation
of the 1990 amendment of Chapter 39 prescribing grounds for place-
ment in secure detention. The youngster had failed to appear in court
and was later taken into custody pursuant to "a court pick up order." '
When he appeared in court the next day, the judge continued him in
secure detention although no new evidence was presented other than
the fact he had been arrested on the court order for failure to appear at
a prior hearing. Chapter 39.037 of the Florida Statutes provides that a
child may be taken into custody for failure to appear at a court hearing
after proper notification. However, under these circumstances, the child
may not be detained unless he meets the criteria of chapter 39.044.""
That statutory section contains two provisions, one providing for initial
detention and the second for continued detention.' 5 If it is determined
that a child will be continued in detention then the provisions of chap-
ter 39.044(2) apply. In the instant case, the trial court made no finding
at the detention hearing that the child met the provisions for continued
detention, which contain standards that are narrower than those for
initial detention. Thus, the appellate court granted the writ."
The appellate courts have labored over a number of years to define
how and under what circumstances a child before the juvenile court
may be held in contempt and incarcerated. In two cases decided in the
mid 1980s, A.O. v. State47 and R.M.P. v. Jones,'8 the supreme court
held that the trial court had no power to find contempt under Chapter
39, but retained inherent authority to punish a child for contempt in-
cluding placement in secure detention for a reasonable period of time.' 9
41. P.H., 570 So. 2d at 1098 (Letts, J., specially concurring).
42. 572 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.037-.044 (Supp. 1990)).
45. Id. at 25 n.l (citing Fla. Stat. § 39.044(d)(4) (Supp. 1990). The initial deci-
sion is made by HRS intake personnel when the child is brought to the detention
center. The continued detention decision is made by the court at a detention hearing.
46. Id. at 25-26.
47. 4:56 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1984).
48. 419 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1982).
49. A.O., 456 So. 2d at 1175; R.M.P., 456 So. 2d at 620 (holding that the au-
thority existed outside Chapter 39).
Dale
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In 1990, in T.D.L. v. Chinault,50 the Second District Court of Appeals
held that under the 1988 statute a child could not be placed in secure
detention, but with appropriate findings could be punished by incarcer-
ation in county jail.51
As part of its 1990 changes to the Florida Juvenile Justice Act,
the legislature added a new section 52 which set forth procedural rules
for representation by counsel, and notice and an opportunity to be
heard and confront witnesses when a child is subject to contempt of
court."' If the procedures are complied with, it would appear a child
could then be held in secure detention. In A.A. v. Rolle,5"' a child
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he could not be held
in the local juvenile detention center for contempt under the 1990 law.
The child argued that chapter 39.042 defines detention criteria in such
a way that punishment was eliminated as a grounds for incarceration.55
50. 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
51. Id. at 1336; see also 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1186.
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10) (Supp. 1990) which provides:
(10) Any child placed into detention for contempt of court shall be repre-
sented by legal counsel as provided in s. 30.041. The following due process
rights must be provided during all stages of any proceeding under this
chapter:
(a) The right to have the charges against the child in writing served a
reasonable time before the hearing.
(b) The right to a hearing before a court.
(c) The right to an explanation of the nature and consequences of the
proceeding.
(d) The right to confront witnesses.
(e) The right to present witnesses.
(f) The right to have a transcript or record of the proceedings.
(g) The right to appeal to an appropriate court.
A child shall not be placed in a jail or other facility intended for the deten-
tion of adults pursuant to this subsection.
54. 580 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
55. Id. at 283; see FLA. STAT. § 39.042 (Supp. 1990) which provides:
(1) All determinations and court orders regarding the use of secure,
non secure, or home detention shall be based primarily upon findings that
the child:
(a) Presents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent
hearing;
(b) Presents a substantial risk of inflicting bodily harm on others as
evidenced by recent behavior;
(c) Presents a history of committing a serious property offense prior to
adjudication, disposition, or placement; or
[Vol. 16
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The appellate court upheld the trial court's contempt power. It recon-
ciled the definitional language of chapter 39.042 with chapter
39.044(10), explaining that the detention criteria which prohibit pun-
ishment apply only to a child who is alleged to have committed a delin-
quent act. Because a child held in contempt has not committed a delin-
quent act, the detention criteria do not apply.56 Reading the provisions
in pari materia, the court held the child could be securely detained.57
The dangers of inappropriate use of contempt in a delinquency
case were made evident in a Fourth District Court of Appeal case, In-
terest of R.A.58 This was a per curiam denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus with an extensive dissent by Judge Glickstein. Appar-
ently, the trial judge ordered the child into secure detention for ninety
days based upon contempt but where the child would be moved to a
residential program where the child would "burn off," to use the trial
court's words, the ninety days of contempt after placement.5 9 However,
because there was no space in the residential program, the trial court
ordered secure detention until the child could be placed.60 Judge Glick-
stein was not concerned with whether the court had the authority to
hold the child in contempt, but with two other issues. First, the trial
court was obligated to comply with proper procedures to find con-
tempt.61 In Judge Glickstein's view, the record was incomplete in this
regard. Second, the intent of the legislature was not to allow a child to
remain in secure detention because of contempt as an alternative to
placement in an HRS program.62
(d) Requests protection from imminent bodily harm.
56. Id. at 283-84.
57. The court distinguished the T.D.L. v. Chinault case on grounds that it was
no longer good law because of the 1990 legislative changes which state that a juvenile
detention center may be used as a sanction for contempt and that the new section
39.044(10) provides that "[a] child shall not be placed in a jail or other facility in-
tended for the detention of adults pursuant to the subsection." Id. at 284 n.4.
58. 575 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
59. ld.
60. Id. at 808.
61. Failure to comply with due process procedural rights in juvenile contempt
proceedings is common nationwide. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Non-criminal Juvenile Detention Has Been
Reduced But Better Monitoring is Needed in Court) (April 19, 1991). See also GARY
CRIPPEN, VALID COURT ORDER EXCEPTION: YES OR No? (1990) (arguing against the
use of contempt on public policy grounds).
62. 575 So. 2d at 807.
Dale
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C. Adjudicatory Issues
The procedural device known as nolle prosequi or nol pros"3 has
recently been held to apply in juvenile delinquency cases in the same
manner as in adult criminal cases. Relying on two earlier adult cases,64
the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that the decision to file the nol
pros rests in the sole discretion of the prosecutor. Permission of the
trial court is not necessary. In State v. M.J.B., the prosecution asked
for a trial continuance. When the request was denied, the prosecution
announced that it would nol pros the case.6 5 The defense attorney
asked that the case be dismissed for failure to present evidence and the
court granted the motion. When the state re-filed the petition and the
child moved to dismiss alleging double jeopardy, the trial court dis-
missed and the state appealed.66 As the appellate court put it, "even
though the practice of entertaining a nolle prosequi in re-filing the pe-
tition after a continuance has been denied may seem underhanded, the
state has the discretion to act in this manner. '67
Although Florida's Rules of Juvenile Procedure contain detailed
discovery provisions, issues in this area continue to appear in appellate
decisions.6 8 In Z.B. v. State,"9 a child appealed an adjudication of de-
linquency for two counts of battery on a school official. The discovery
issue involved the trial court's order excluding a defense witness from
testifying. Holding that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate
inquiry as defined in the Florida Supreme Court case of Richardson v.
63. Nolle prosequi is defined as a formal entry on the record by the prosecuting
officer in a criminal case in which he or she declares that he or she will not prosecute
the case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 568-69 (1985) (suggesting that unbridled
discretion in the prosecutor to nol pros has resulted in legislation or rules of court in a
number of jurisdictions the purpose of which is to restrain the use of the power. The
most common method is to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons for so doing in
writing).
64. See State v. Padron, 506 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Kahmke, 468 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
65. 576 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 967 (both the majority and concurrence suggested that if there was
other alleged misconduct or if the purpose had been to harass or gain some other unfair
advantage against the accused then it might be possible for the trial court judge to
dismiss the re-filed charges).
68. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060 (newly renumbered in 1991 from FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.070).
69. 576 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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State,7 0 the appellate court reversed the adjudication and remanded for
a new trial.7 The court found that the child had been guilty of a dis-
covery violation in not advising the state of the identity of a defense
witness until the day of trial. However, the trial court failed to find out
what the witness was prepared to testify about, and then made no in-
quiry or finding as to whether the discovery violation resulted in
prejudice to the state. This, according to the appellate court, was re-
versible error. 2 Furthermore, the trial court had imposed the extreme
sanction of exclusion without exploring other remedies such as a recess
or deposition and whether those alternatives would have cured the
prejudice. This also was reversible error.7
Under Florida law, a delinquency petition must be filed within
forty-five days of the time the child is taken into custody, the juvenile
law analogue to arrest.74 Interpreting the forty-five day rule has been
an ongoing matter in the appellate courts. 5 In B.T. v. State, 6 the First
District 'Court of Appeals faced the question of whether it was proper
for the court to allow the state to file a second amended petition outside
the statutory forty-five day time frame. The amended petition changed
a sexual battery charge from one involving lack of consent to one in-
volving lack of intelligent voluntary consent.7 The prosecution changed
the charge when it was determined that the twenty-two year old men-
tally handicapped cousin, who was the victim of the alleged sexual bat-
tery, was not able to give legal consent.78 The appellate court suggested
that under the facts there was no harm to the child because he was
aware that the state would have to prove either that the victim had not
agreed to the battery or that the consent was not intelligent, knowing,
and voluntary. Further, counsel admitted knowledge and notice of the
original arrest report which said that the victim was mentally disabled.
70. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971) (known as a Richardson inquiry).
71. Z.B., 576 So. 2d at 1356.
72. Id. at 1357.
73. Id.
74. See FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.048(6)
(Supp. 1990)).
75. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1173-76 (discussing other cases on this
subject).
76. 573 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (1989) (a second degree felony); FLA. STAT. §
794.011(4) (1989) (a first degree felony).
78. Id.; B.T., 573 So. 2d at 103-04.
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Thus, there was no claim of surprise. 9 However, because of an appar-
ent conflict among the districts on the issue of what magnitude of
change is necessary to constitute the filing of a new petition, as opposed
to an amendment to the original, the court certified the question as one
of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.80
In a second case State v. F.T.H.,8" the state appealed from an
order dismissing a delinquency petition for failure to comply with the
forty-five day speedy trial rule. The trial court had ruled that the child
was taken into custody when a police officer approached the youngster,
told him he matched the description of the robbery suspect, asked him
his name, address and phone number, and then took his photograph.
The juvenile and the police officer then went their separate ways and
no arrest was made at that time.82 The appellate court disagreed with
the trial court's conclusion that the youngster had been taken into cus-
tody at that point. Holding that taking a child into custody under
Chapter 39 was akin to arrest of an adult, the court ruled that the
encounter rose to the level of a temporary detention but was not
equivalent to arrest. Thus, the child was not taken into custody. 3 The
court further ruled that physical control as defined in Florida Statute
section 39.01(51) does not include police encounters or temporary in-
vestigatory detention. This conclusion is without citation.
A third case is V.C.F. v. State.8 4 In that case, the child appealed
from a judgment of the circuit court which withheld an adjudication of
79. B.T., 573 So. 2d at 104.
80. Id.; see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v). The specific question presented
was:
Under the circumstances of this case, does Rule 8.110, F.R.C.J.P.
permit amendment of an original timely petition for delinquency more
than 45 days after arrest to correct the specified subsection of a sexual
battery charge under section [chapter] 794.011, Florida statutes, from
subsection (5) to subsection (4), both involving lack of intelligent volun-
tary consent as there defined?
B.T., 573 So. 2d at 104.
81. 579 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
82. Id. at 912. The encounter lasted 10 to 30 minutes and the delinquency peti-
tion was filed 47 days after the encounter.
83. Id. The term "taken into custody" is found at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (Supp.
1990) which states: "'Taken into custody' means the status of a child immediately
when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by
law, pending the child's release, detention, placement, or other disposition as authorized
by law."
84. 569 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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delinquency and placement on community control, claiming the trial
court incorrectly denied a motion to dismiss because the state failed to
file within forty-five days of the youngster's arrest in the state of Kan-
sas. The appellate court concluded that because the State of Florida
filed the petition within forty-five days of the date the youngster re-
turned to Florida and was placed in custody of the Florida officials,
there was no violation of the Florida statute.8 The appellate court re-
jected the state's argument that the juvenile speedy trial rule should be
construed in comparison to the Florida rule of criminal procedure on
speedy trial.86 Finding no Florida case on point,8" however, the court
held that in order for the forty-five day rule to make sense, all provi-
sions of Chapter 39 had to be read and interpreted in pari materia.8
First, the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, to which Florida is a signa-
tory,80 provides that a youngster is subject to the laws of the foreign
state when initially taken into custody and remains there until he re-
turns to Florida. Second, Chapter 39 contains sections providing for the
processing of the youngster upon return to Florida.90 These provisions
for processing take time, and if the speedy trial rule were to commence
upon taking the child into custody in a foreign state, the time frames
within which to carry them out might be impossible to meet. The court
concluded that the statute could not be read to interfere with these two
sections of the law.9 1
In Florida, trial court jurisdiction in a delinquency case ceases
when a child reaches nineteen years of age.92 A jurisdictional question
arose in D.M. v. State, where the trial court failed to adjudicate the
child delinquent or withhold adjudication, but set the case for a disposi-
tional hearing five days after the juvenile was to reach the age of
nineteen.9 3 When the child filed a motion to terminate jurisdiction after
his nineteenth birthday, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order adjudi-
cating the child delinquent as of the date of the trial.94 The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reversed finding that the purpose of a nunc pro
85. Id.
86. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
87. V.C.F., 569 So. 2d at 1365.
88. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.51-.516 (1989).
90. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01, .05 (1989).
91. VC.F., 569 So. 2d at 1367.
92. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(4) (Supp. 1990).
93. 580 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id.
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tunc order is to correct a clerical mistake or refer to judicial acts which
memorialize a previously-taken judicial act. The purpose is not to make
a new or de novo decision, or supply an omitted action by the court
which occurred here.9
5
D. Dispositional Issues
Once adjudicatory and dispositional hearings have been held and
the child is awaiting placement in an HRS facility, Florida statutes
limit the length of time the child can be held in secure detention. Until
the passage of the 1990 law, the period was five days."6 The five-day
rule produced a number of appellate decisions admonishing the trial
courts to comply with that provision.9 7 Perhaps recognizing that the
time constraints were difficult to meet, the legislature amended the law
in 1990 to provide that in addition to the five-day period in secure de-
tention, HRS is allowed an additional ten days from the date of com-
mitment to transfer the child from secure detention to non-secure or
home detention if HRS timely seeks an order for continued detention.9
Regretfully, HRS seems unable to comply with the new rule as
evidenced by the First District Court of Appeals decision in R.L. v.
State.9 9 HRS exceeded both the initial five-day secure detention limit
and the total fifteen-day transfer time limit. HRS argued that because
the child was ultimately released to home detention the case was moot.
95. Id.
96. See FLA. STAT. § 959.12 (1989).
97. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1182-83 (citing cases decided in 1989);
1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 873-74 (discussing a 1989 case).
98. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(11) (Supp. 1990) provides:
When a child is committed to the department awaiting dispositional
placement, removal of the child from detention care shall occur within 5
days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. A child placed
into secure detention care and committed to the department who is await-
ing dispositional placement in a commitment program shall be transferred
by the department into non secure or home detention care if placement
does not occur within 5 days after commitment, excluding Saturdays, Sun-
days, and legal holidays. If the child is committed to a residential pro-
gram, the department may seek an order from the court authorizing con-
tinued detention for a specific period of time necessary for the appropriate
residential placement of the child. However, such continued detention in
secure detention care or transfer to non secure or home detention care
shall not exceed 15 days after commitment, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays.
99. 578 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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The court disagreed, holding simply that the time frames were violated
and that the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the child should be
granted. 0
Further evidence of HRS' problems can be found in Interest of
M.C.. 101 There the youngster was waiting for placement in a facility for
mentally disturbed children. HRS could not immediately place the
child because of lack of space in appropriate programs. The child re-
mained in secure detention beyond the statutory period. The Court
granted the writ. Then, recognizing that this problem was on-going for
some time, the court opined that "what this shows us is that all of the
legislative changes will mean nothing unless the legislature has com-
mitted resources to expand the treatment programs for juveniles."102 It
remains to be seen whether the necessary appropriations will be forth-
coming from the legislature. If they are not, the appellate courts will be
forced to continue ordering the release of children who need services on
writs of habeas corpus for lack of compliance with statutory time
frames.
A technical but not insignificant issue of appellate practice was
recently presented to the First District Court of Appeals in K.K.P. v.
State.'0 3 In that case, a child was charged with escape from a juvenile
facility in Duval County. The trial court found the appellant had com-
mitted the escape and transferred the matter to the Circuit Court of
Pinellas County, the youngster's county of residence. That circuit court
adjudicated the child delinquent and ordered commitment to HRS.
The child appealed to the First District Court of Appeals which hears
appeals from the Judicial Circuit in Duval County. The child's argu-
ment, in response to an order to show cause at the trial level why the
case should not be transferred to the Second District Court of Appeals,
was that the youngster did not intend to contest the order of disposition
but rather the adjudicatory order. The First District Court of Appeals,
on its own motion, transferred the case to the Second District Court of
Appeals for the following reasons. First, the only order entered by a
circuit court in the First District was the finding that the child had
100. Id. at 863. The court noted that although no placement was available to
HRS and would not be available for months, the statute is mandatory and there must
be compliance. This case demonstrates the on-going problem produced by the lack of
funding for delinquency commitment programs.
101. 567 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 1039.
103. :580 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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committed the escape and that order was not an adjudicatory order.
Second, even if it was an adjudicatory order, the case was then trans-
ferred to a court in the Second Appellate District for all purposes.
Third, even if the Second District Court of Appeals would agree with
the child's argument that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate
him, the only relief available would be to discharge the child, an order
which should be directed to the judicial circuit over which the First
District Court of Appeals had no power. 04
Various provisions of the delinquency law governing dispositional
alternatives continue to raise problems as evidenced by recent appellate
court decisions. 105 For example, in M.L. v. State,10 6 the First District
Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether the trial court could
place a child on community control, Florida's term for probation, after
release from commitment when such disposition was not ordered in the
original commitment proceeding. 10 The child had been adjudicated to
have escaped from an HRS facility and was committed to HRS' cus-
tody for an indeterminent term not to exceed the child's nineteenth
birthday or the maximum allowed by law. 108 When the particular com-
mitment program did not work out, a hearing was held on the issue of
imposition of community control following the child's discharge from
the commitment. The child raised the issue of whether the placement
on community control would constitute an improper increase in punish-
ment. A modification of the original disposition order allowing the
change in status was made over the child's objection.
In a technical decision interpreting several provisions, the appel-
late court in M.L. concluded that the modification order was appropri-
ate under the Florida statute. First, the court concluded that the law
allowed the trial court to make an order placing the child on commu-
nity control following discharge from commitment in the initial or-
der.10 9 Second, under the court's general dispositional powers, the court
104. Id. at 308.
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
106. 578 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
107. Id. at 465.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(3)(e) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.047(3)(e)1-5
(1991)) provides in relevant part:
The court may also require the child be placed in a community control
program following the child's discharge from commitment. Community-
based sanctions may be imposed by the court at the disposition hearing or
at any time prior to the child's release from commitment.
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only retains authority to discharge a child from commitment if in the
original commitment order it retained authority to do so."' The appel-
late court concluded that the trial court could require that a child be
placed in a community control program following the child's discharge
from commitment and that the provision holding that the court had no
authority over the discharge of the child from commitment, unless the
court in its commitment order had stated that it retained jurisdiction,
did not apply. It found the order in this case was a modification which
did not purport to discharge the child from HRS commitment status.'
There are two problems with the court's decision. First, the very
statute the court sought to avoid, chapter 39.11(4), Florida Statutes,
states that a subsequent modification of a dispositional order is permit-
ted only where the trial court retained authority to do so in its original
order."' The trial court failed to do this in its commitment order.
There is no exception to the statute. Second, apparently in an effort to
avoid chapter 39.11(4) which is absolute on its face in precluding fur-
ther court authority over discharge of the child in absence of the ten-
sion of jurisdiction in the commitment order, the appellate court argued
that chapter 39.09(3)(e) actually gave it continuing authority." 3 This
section allows the court to add community-based sanctions prior to the
child's release from commitment and after the initial commitment or-
der. The problem with the court's reasoning is that community-based
sanctions are not the same as community control. Community-based
sanctions may be a part of community control but community control is
far more extensive. Community-based sanctions include restitution,
curfew and revocation of the child's driver's license and they may be
110. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054 (Supp. 1990).
111. M.L., 578 So. 2d at 466.
112. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(4) (1989) (recodified FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1991))
states:
(4) Any commitment of a delinquent child to the department shall be for
an indeterminate period of time, but the time shall not exceed the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense
.... Under no circumstances shall the court have authority over the dis-
charge of a child from commitment provided in this subsection unless the
court, in its commitment order, states that it retains such authority.
113. Id. at 465-66; FLA. STAT. § 39.09(3)(e) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.047(3)(e)1-5 (1991)) states in relevant part:
If the court decides to commit a child to the department, the department
shall furnish the court, in order of the preference of the department, a list
of not less than three options for programs in which the child may be
placed.
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considered as part of community control. To read the statute as the
court has is to avoid the language of chapter 39.11(4). " 4
May a court prohibit a child from wearing certain clothing or jew-
elry as a condition of community control? The issue was raised in L.S.
v. State1 5 where the trial court, on recommendation of HRS, imposed
a condition that the child not wear any jewelry. The child had been
adjudicated delinquent for possession of marijuana and sale of cocaine.
The case was a per curiam affirmance upholding the condition with a
dissent by Judge Griffin who argued that the case fit within the test of
Grubbs v. State.116 Judge Griffin reasoned that a condition of commu-
nity control must be related to the offense and that the standard of
conduct imposed be essential to rehabilitation as well as protection of
the public. He believed that there was nothing in the record to indicate
that jewelry was in any way connected with the child or the crimes
committed by the youngster. Nor was there any showing that the use of
jewelry was more typical of drug dealers than law-abiding citizens, or
that prohibiting its use would impair the ability to sell drugs.1 1 7 Fi-
nally, Judge Griffin noted that selection of apparel is a basic means of
personal expression, concluding that "there is not a great difference be-
tween forcing a probationer to wear certain clothing or symbols as a
badge of shame and prohibiting the wearing of certain items.' '1 8
E. Transfer Issues
Appeals involving issues related to the transfer and handling of
juveniles in adult court continued this past year. In certain situations, a
child may be tried in adult court under Florida law.'1 9 One of the re-
quirements calls for the court to decide whether a child should receive
adult or juvenile sanctions when a child has been tried as an adult and
convicted, irrespective of whether the child was waived to adult court
114. In a sense, all of this begs the more significant public policy question of
whether dispositional orders under Florida law should be viewed as rehabilitative in
nature or punitive in nature. If they are punitive in nature, then to modify them to
require the child to suffer a greater penalty smacks of double jeopardy. On the other
hand, if the goal is rehabilitation, then modifications to help the child are appropriate.
115. 575 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
116. 373 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla. 1979).
117. L.S., 575 So. 2d at 331.
118. Id. at 332.
119. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.02(4), .04(5) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.059 (Supp. 1990)).
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or the proceeding began in the adult court under the direct file provi-
sions.120 The court must consider six criteria. 12 1 Yet, the trial courts
continue to violate the written binding provisions of the statute which
states that:
Suitability for adult sanctions is determined by reference to
the six criteria and any decisions shall be in writing and in con-
formity with those criteria with the court making a specific finding
of fact and reasons for the decision. 23
In Tighe v. State, s a child who had been sentenced as an adult
on a series of offenses argued on appeal that the trial court had failed
to enter adequate written findings to support the imposition of adult
sanctions. The appellate court found that the record did not reveal that
the trial court made any written findings of fact. The appellate court
explained that even a transcript which is made a part of the appellate
record might satisfy the statute if it contained oral findings of fact and
reasons for the decision, as opposed to being part of the written
record.""'
In Taylor v. State,1 25 the Fifth District Court of Appeal remanded
for findings to support the imposition of adult sanctions in the case
where a youngster, nearly seventeen years old, had been convicted of
attempted first degree murder of a police officer. There, the closest item
to a separate written order containing findings supporting the decision
to impose adult sanctions was a two-part commentary on the sentenc-
ing score sheet stating that the court had made findings as provided by
120. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.052(2), .022(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
121. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(6) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(6) (Supp.
1990)).
122. FLA. STAT. § 39.111(7)(c) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(c)
(1991)); see also 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1187-88 (describing prior cases in
which the lower courts failed to comply with the statute).
123. 571 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
124. Id. at 84. In a significant concurrence, Judge Dauksch argued that the 1990
Supreme Court opinion in Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990) should apply to
juveniles. Pope held that where an appellate court reverses an adult departure sentence
because there were no written reasons, the appellate court must remand for resentenc-
ing with no possibility of departure from the guideline. According to Judge Dauksch,
the effect in a juvenile context is a remand with instructions to impose juvenile sanc-
tions. 573 So. 2d at 84.
125. 5,73 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Chapter 39 that the juvenile sanctions were not appropriate. 12 The ap-
pellate court noted that the state had not asserted on appeal that the
requisite findings were made on the record at the sentencing hearing
which the court of appeal would have accepted had they been made.12 7
Thus, the court remanded.
A separate adult sentencing guideline issue arose in Lang v.
State,"'8 where a child charged as an adult with armed robbery entered
into a plea agreement to reduce the charge to robbery with a weapon
along with a recommendation from the state for a guideline sentence.
The court rejected the defense counsel's plea that it impose juvenile
sanctions or, if it imposed adult sanctions, to withhold adjudication and
place the child on probation or community control. The appellate court
first ruled that a negotiated plea of guilty to a reduced charge and
recommended guideline sentence does not by itself act as a waiver of
the court's obligation to address the six specified criteria for the imposi-
tion of adult sanctions under chapter 39.111(7)(c). Relying on the su-
preme court decision in State v. Rohden,1 29 the court stated that, had
the child waived or bargained away his right to have the court consider
adult sanctions under the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, it would have
upheld the adult sentence. However, it could find no such waiver in the
Lang case. And thus, the trial court was obligated to comply with
chapter 39.111. The appellate court then found like so many appellate
courts before it, that the trial court had failed to make proper findings
for sentencing the child as an adult. For example, a check list used by
the trial court was found not to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 39
because the court is required to render specific findings of fact with the
reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions using all six
criteria. 3o
The problems in Florida's Juvenile Justice System also manifest
themselves in cases involving the lack of dispositional alternatives in
juvenile delinquency cases. Chapter 39 provides that when a court de-
cides that it shall commit a child to HRS, the department shall furnish
a list of not less than three placement alternatives to the court and rank
126. Id. at 174.
127. Id. at 175.
128. 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
129. 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
130. Lang, 566 So. 2d at 1357 (citing Keith v. State, 542 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 881-83 (discussing
Keith and other cases).
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them in order of preference.' 31 In Interest of C.S., 3 2 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's substitution of another
program option for one of the three furnished by HRS, finding that the
trial court cannot do so on the basis of prior case law and the statute. 133
It can be expected that if the state's financial difficulties continue, the
appeals courts will continue to be upset with the placement alternatives
provided by HRS.
III. DEPENDENCY
A. Right to Counsel Issues
Appellate cases involving questions of the role of counsel in the
dependency field regularly come before Florida's courts of appeal."'
They demonstrate the ongoing inability of trial courts to properly ad-
dress the right to and role of counsel in dependency proceedings. By
statute in Florida, the parents are entitled to representation by counsel
in a dependency proceeding. However, Florida's law does not provide
for the absolute right to appointment of counsel free of charge for an
indigent parent.' 35 Any decision to appoint a lawyer is made on an indi-
vidual basis.' 6
Two cases decided this past year exemplify the continuing prob-
lem. In Interest of G.L.O., 37 the appellate court reversed and re-
131. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)1 (Supp. 1990).
132. 573 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
133. Id. at 169 (citing M.M. v. Korda, 544 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989); see 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 873 (discussing Korda); 1990 Survey, supra
note 7, at 1185-86 (discussing other recent cases); see also HRS v. R.S., 567 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (commenting on trial court exceeding its statutory
authority by specifying, in dicta, the facility in which HRS might place the child).
134. See 1988 Survey, supra note 11, at 1171-74; 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at
885; 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1188-91 (discussing cases decided in past years and
briefly discussing the analytic framework for the right to counsel for parties in depen-
dency proceedings); Michael J. Dale, The Right to Counsel in Dependency Proceed-
ings, Florida Continuing Legal Education Chapter (available currently through the
Nova Law Review and forthcoming from CLE).
135. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1989); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.560. See generally Inter-
est of D.B., and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
136. See Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1052 (1984); Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975) (setting certain criteria pur-
suant to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974)
(to determine whether appointed counsel is required)).
137. 573 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (interestingly, the appellant
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manded an order adjudicating the appellant's son dependent because
the trial court failed to advise the mother of the right to counsel at any
point during the dependency proceeding. In Interest of J.G.,18 the ap-
pellate court affirmed a trial court order refusing to terminate parental
rights and resetting the case for a new dispositional hearing because of
the delay by the state in advising the indigent parents of their right to
counsel in the earlier dependency proceeding. 139 Under Florida law,
HRS is also obligated to advise the parent of his or her right to
counsel. 40
Where parents retain counsel themselves in dependency proceed-
ings, they may, in only very limited situations, seek payment of the
attorney's fees from the state. This issue arose in Interest of A.C., K.C.,
& J.B., Jr.." HRS commenced a dependency proceeding which re-
sulted in a court declaration that one child was dependent based upon
the parents' stipulation to that fact and that the other two children
should return to their parents. Subsequently, the court held HRS and
the child's protective investigator jointly and severally liable for the
parents' attorney's fees." 2 The Second District Court of Appeals held
that the statutory provision governing the award of attorney's fees re-
quired that "the suit must be so clearly devoid of merit based on the
facts or the law as to be completely untenable." 4 3 The court held that
merit is determined at the point the claim is initially presented, and
that there must be a showing that the party made a reasonable effort to
investigate the claims before filing suit.1 ' Applying this test, the court
held that the award of fees could not be sustained because initially
there was a meritorious claim and HRS had made a reasonable
investigation.
Nor does a child possess an absolute constitutional right to counsel
in a dependency proceeding.14 5 However, because of its participation in
the Federal Child Abuse Prevention Act of 1974, Florida provides for a
mother appeared pro se).
138. 577 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
139. Id. at 696. The appellate court described the delay as "outrageous."
140. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1989).
141. 580 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
142. Id. at 884.
143. Id. at 885 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (Supp. 1990); Whitten v. Progres-
sive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982)).
144. Id.
145. See Interest of D.B. and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); 1989 Survey,
supra note 11, at 888-889.
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guardian ad litem program to act on behalf of children in dependency
proceedings.146 A combination of Florida statutes, Florida Rules of Ju-
venile IProcedure and an unreported Florida Supreme Court order de-
fine the role of the guardian ad litem and lawyer if appointed as attor-
ney guardian ad litem.'4 7
The cases of HRS v. Cole"46 and Brevard County v. Hammel, 49
involved issues of payment of guardian ad litem attorney's fees. HRS v.
Cole was a dependency proceeding which emanated from an underlying
divorce. When a custody dispute was consolidated with dependency
proceedings, the juvenile court entered an order appointing the district
guardian ad litem program on behalf of the child. It then asked the
program to appoint a specific guardian ad litem which was done.
Thereafter, apparently because the mother defied a visitation order, the
juvenile court on its own motion appointed a lawyer as attorney guard-
ian ad litem for the child and ordered him to locate the youngster.50
Then, the director of the local guardian ad litem program filed a peti-
tion stating that the program itself had appointed a lawyer as "pro
bono attorney" for the guardian ad litem program and asked that this
lawyer be allowed to attend depositions and that his fees to attend
them be paid by the court. Later both the attorney guardian ad litem
for the child and the attorney for the guardian ad litem program filed
motions for payment of attorney's fees.15 ' The trial court ordered the
county to pay the attorney guardian ad litem's fees and HRS to com-
pensate the guardian ad litem program's attorney. HRS appealed."5 2
After discussing the history of Florida's guardian ad litem pro-
gram, the appellate court found, first, that the court could not appoint
the guardian ad litem program and ask it to choose a specific guardian.
Rather, the court should receive a list of qualified persons from the
program from which the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem."8
Second, the appellate court could find no authority for obligating HRS
146. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv.
P. 8.590(c).
147. See Standard 4.0, State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program Minimal
Standards of Operation (Fla. S. Ct. Admin. Order, Feb. 7, 1985); FLA. STAT. §
415.508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(a).
148. 574 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
149. 575 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
150. Cole, 574 So. 2d at 161.
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 163.
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to pay the attorney's fees for the guardian ad litem program's counsel
because HRS has no statutory responsibility for operating the guardian
ad litem program. The court distinguished earlier decisions which held
that HRS could be responsible for payment of attorney's fees to a
guardian ad litem attorney appointed pursuant to the Florida statute.154
In fact, the guardian ad litem program is operated through the Office
of the State Administrator, a part of the supreme court and not by
HRS.
Brevard County v. Hammel concerned a far simpler matter. The
trial court had entered an order granting an attorney guardian ad li-
tem's motion for an order compensating him the day after his motion
was filed and without providing an opportunity to the county to be
heard in opposition. The court granted the county's writ of certiorari,
quashed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 155
Significantly, the court did not reach the issue of whether HRS or Bre-
vard County was the appropriate entity to pay the attorney's fees as-
suming the county had been given adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard.
More important than the issue of who pays the attorney guardian
ad litem is the question of the proper role of the guardian ad litem in a
dependency proceeding. 151 There is a growing body of case law on the
subject.1 57 The most recent case is In re J.M. and R.M.1 58 There the
guardian ad litem appealed from an order denying the guardian's peti-
tion for dependency and alternative motion for rehearing. The case be-
gan when an HRS child protection investigator filed an affidavit re-
questing detention of the children and thereafter filed a dependency
petition on the basis of information from a physician that one of the
children had experienced significant physical trauma. The court then
appointed a guardian ad litem nominated by the local guardian ad li-
tem program to represent the child's interests.1 59 At the adjudicatory
154. Id. (citing In re M.P., 453 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev.
denied, 472 So. 2d 732 (1985); Interest of R.W., 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), rev. denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (Supp. 1990)).
155. Hammel, 575 So.2d at 773.
156. The guardian ad litem also plays an important role in termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings. See footnotes 148-65 and accompanying text in this article.
157. See 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 888-89; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note
7, at 1201 (discussing prior decisions).
158. 579 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
159. Id. at 821. It is interesting to note that at the adjudicatory hearing HRS,
the parents, and the guardian ad litem were represented by separate counsel.
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hearing, the court found that HRS had failed by a preponderance of
the evidence to prove dependency.
Approximately two weeks later, the guardian ad litem filed a peti-
tion for dependency and, in the alternative, a motion for new hearing'60
on the basis of a statement made by one of the children to an adult
care-giver at a residential facility. The guardian ad litem argued that
HRS had been aware of this statement, but had not advised the guard-
ian ad litem of it. The guardian argued that a separate party's notice to
HRS or its agents does not constitute notice to the guardian. The trial
court rejected both arguments by finding that the evidence was not
newly-discovered and attributed HRS' knowledge to the guardian.
Treating the motion for a new hearing as a motion for rehearing, the
trial court denied it as not timely filed. It then dismissed the guardian's
petition for dependency.
The appellate court found that the guardian ad litem functions in-
dependent of, and has separate party status from, HRS in a depen-
dency proceeding. 161 The appeals court also noted that the guardian ad
litem program is administered by the Office of the State Administrator
under the supervision of the supreme court, whereas HRS is a separate
administrative agency.162 The court then held that pursuant to Florida
Statute section 39.404(1), the guardian ad litem is a person who may
commence a dependency proceeding. 163 Pursuant to discovery rules, the
guardian also was entitled to learn from HRS the names and addresses
of all persons who might have relevant information as well as obtain
statements given to HRS by these persons.6  Because HRS failed to
provide discovery, the information constituted newly-discovered evi-
dence upon which the guardian, as an independent party, was entitled
to file either a petition for dependency or a motion for a new hearing.
The appellate court reversed and remanded to consider the newly-dis-
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ .503(a), .508 (Supp. 1990); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.540,
8.590; HRS v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
162. Id. This case raises the interesting issue of who then should be paying
guardians ad litem. Some of the older case law suggests that HRS can be made to pay
apparently because of Florida's funding under the Federal Adoption Assistance Act the
flow of which funds passes through HRS.
163. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (Supp. 1990) provides in relevant part that "any
.. . person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and believe
that they are true, may file a dependency petition."
164. In re J.M. and R.M., 579 So. 2d at 822 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.770(a)(2)(i)-(iii)).
Dale
27
Dale: Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
covered evidence and such other evidence as deemed necessary to de-
cide the dependency issue. 165
B. Procedural Issues
Confidentiality in dependency proceedings and the public's right to
know raises thorny constitutional problems. Two cases decided recently
elucidate the issues. In Florida Publishing Co. v. Brooke,'66 a Jackson-
ville newspaper's reporter asked the First District Court of Appeal to
review an order of the circuit court in Duval County which prohibited
them from publishing the contents of a letter from a licensed psycholo-
gist in a dependency proceeding.' 7 The appellate court granted the pe-
tition and quashed the order for three reasons. First, it interpreted
chapter 39.408(2)(c) which allows a trial court to close a dependency
proceeding in the court's discretion and in certain proceedings man-
dates that they be closed.168 It held that this confidential proceedings
section could not reach the letter which was no longer part of the pro-
ceedings. Second, it held that Florida's statutory provision governing
the maintenance of court records by the clerk did not provide authority
for the trial judge to restrain publication because the letter was not a
court record as defined in the relevant statute. 69 Third, it found that
the judge's order constituted prior restraint in violation of the newspa-
per's rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
165. Id. at 823.
166. 576 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Id. at 844. The letter which the newspaper wished to publish came from a
psychologist, was sent to an HRS official and was sharply critical of HRS actions and
its employees. Copies of the letter were forwarded to the court, the attorney-guardian
ad litem for the child and through the court to other counsel as record. Ultimately, the
child's mother gave a copy of the letter to the newspaper reporter.
168. Id. at 845 citing FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(c) (Supp. 1990) which provides in
relevant part:
(c) All hearings, except as hereinafter provided, shall be open to the pub-
lic, and no person shall be excluded therefrom except on special order of
the judge, who, in his discretion, may close any hearing to the public when
the public interest or the welfare of the child, in his opinion, is best served
by so doing. All hearings involving unwed mothers, custody, sexual abuse,
or permanent placement of children shall remain confidential and closed to
the public. Hearings involving more than one child may be held simultane-
ously when the several children involved are related to each other or were
involved in the same case. The child and the parents or legal custodians of
the child may be examined separately and apart from each other.
169. Id. at 845 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.411 (Supp. 1990)).
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tion and article I, section 4, of the Florida Constitution. The court
could find no facts which would overcome the presumptive unconstitu-
tionality of prior restraint. 70
The issue of confidentiality came up in an entirely different con-
text in Brown v. Pate.17 1 In that case, a parent moved to disqualify the
judge con grounds which included a claim that the judge had opened the
dependency proceedings to members of the news media contrary to
chapter 39.408(2)(c), the same confidentiality provision which was in-
volved in the Brooke case. The father argued that trying the case in the
media was not in the best interests of the children, that the court's
order making the matter public was received by the media prior to the
father's counsel, that the court had made comments about its concern
about allowing the children to have access to their father, and that the
court had made comments implicating the father in the homicide of his
wife, for which homicide he later had been found not guilty in a crimi-
nal case. 7 12 The appeals court rejected all of the grounds for recusal
and specifically found that the court's decision to open the hearing to
the media was not a basis for disqualification.1 73
A procedural case with significant overtones is HRS v. D.H.171 A
boy had been found dependent because the mother was hospitalized
and comatose, the father was in jail, and a legal guardian turned the
child over to HRS because that person could no longer care for him. 175
In a dependency proceeding, the court ordered the care, custody and
control of D.H. to be placed in HRS. Six months later, when HRS filed
its standard petition for review and the court learned that, in the in-
terim, the child had been charged with homicide and jailed, the court
vacated the order of dependency and left the child in the total care of
the jailers. 70
The appellate court noted that Florida law gives the court the op-
tion to terminate jurisdiction over the child after the statutory six-
170. Id. at 846 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 558
(1976); Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stew-
art, J., concurring); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)).
171. 577 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
172. Id. at 646-47.
173. Id. at 647. Whether the ruling was correct as a matter of law was not
before the court.
174. 575 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1382-83.
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month period of review. 177 It held that the court also had authority to
continue jurisdiction and keep the child in the care of HRS. 7 8 Then, in
pointed language, it said:
All children need someone to look after their welfare and to be
concerned for them. That need does not end upon, nor is it dimin-
ished by, incarceration. A good argument could be made that this
child now needs someone to look after him more than ever; some-
one other than just a lawyer, who will only look after his legal
needs.1 7
9
Finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to
accede to the wishes of HRS, which would have continued to care for
the child, the appellate court reversed the order terminating jurisdic-
tion and remanded for further proceedings. 80
C. Adjudicatory Issues
Challenges to the trial court's findings of fact are regularly liti-
gated in the appellate courts. 8' A rather frustrated appellate bench
continues to see cases in which the trial court fails to state the facts
upon which a dependency finding is made as required by Florida stat-
ute.1"' As in the case of delinquency proceedings, where the trial court
fails to articulate the basis for a transfer to adult court or sentence as
an adult, the failure to state the facts upon which a dependency finding
is made is reversible error. 188 However, recent appellate cases also sug-
gest that the courts of appeals may go beyond the statutory mandate
and decide whether, irrespective of the failure to make factual findings,
evidence exists in the record to support the determination of depen-
dency.' 84 Luszczyk v. HRS 8 5 is a typical case. The trial court removed
177. See id. at 1383 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.453(l)(b) (Supp. 1990)).
178. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(7) (1989) (recodified at FLA. STAT. §
39.072(7) (1991)) which states that an indictment for murder does not remove the
court's jurisdiction over the child).
179. D.H., 575 So. 2d at 1383.
180. Id.
181. See 1988 Survey, supra note 11, at 1175-78; Dale, 1989 Survey, supra note
11, at 893; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1192-93.
182. FLA. STAT. § 39.409(3) (1989); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.650.
183. See 1989 Survey, supra note 11, at 1173-74; Dale, 1990 Survey, supra note
7, at 1191-93.
184. See Interest of T.S., 557 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
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a youngster from the mother's home and placed the child in the tempo-
rary custody of the paternal grandparents without making written find-
ings of fact. The appeals court simply found that the failure to make
the findings was reversible error, there being no record.lse
In Interest of D.H. and M.H.,8'8 the issue was whether the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure required findings of fact in addition to the
conclusion that the child was not dependent in a trial court order which
denies aL dependency petition - the opposite of the usual issue on appeal
which involves the failure to make written findings of dependency. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying
the petition for an adjudication of dependency, but certified the ques-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court in light of its finding that Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.650 only speaks to findings of fact in the case of
the determination of dependency. s8
In Williams v. HRS, 89 the court was also faced with an order of
adjudication of dependency which failed to contain the statutory-man-
dated findings. Similarly, the order of disposition failed to comply with
requirements related to the "reasonable efforts" that HRS must make
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of a child from his
home. 9 The court found that the failure to comply with the statutory
requirements was reversible error. 19' It also commented that the dispo-
sitional order could not be salvaged because it neither tracked the facts
of the dependency petition nor referred to a previous order which con-
tained the proper findings.192 The court's explanation of the need for
1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1193 (criticizing this approach).
185. 576 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
186. Id. at 432. The opinion is silent as to why the court did not look to the
record for factual findings. Perhaps the answer is that the court also found other rea-
sons to reverse. The court noted the failure to hold a hearing on the evidentiary issue of
the trustworthiness of the child's out of court statement to two psychologists pursuant
to Florida Statute § 90.803(23). The appellate court also reversed on the basis that the
trial court committed error by allowing a psychologist, HRS caseworkers and the
guardian ad litem to testify as to their opinions that the child was telling the truth.
187. 575 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
188. Id. at 762.
189. 568 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
190. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4) (Supp. 1990).
191. William, 568 So. 2d at 997. In this particular case, the question was
whether the parents had abused their child through excessive use of corporal
pjinishment.
192. I'd. (relying upon the holdings in Castellanos v. HRS, 545 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
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finding of facts is particularly illuminating and contains reasoning simi-
lar to that expressed by this writer in the past." The court commented
that irrespective of the statutory obligation to make findings, "it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to review the basis upon which the trial court
arrived at its determination of dependency in the absence of those find-
ings." 94 The court recognized that the legislative mandate to make
specific findings "can be overdone and are burdensome."1 95 But, as the
court added, the requirement seems logical, and the findings are useful
to assist the parties and others to understand the court's reasoning for
finding dependency and its plan for remedial action.1 96 It also creates a
record for the court to look back to in subsequent proceedings, aids a
successor judge, and allows the court to make later decisions without
having to review the entire record. 97
In Hardy v. HRS,198 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals also
was faced with an appeal from an adjudication and disposition of de-
pendency in which the trial court failed to restate the factual basis for
the court's finding of dependency in its dispositional order. The appel-
late court in Hardy rejected this argument as not violative of chapter
39.409(3) because the trial court had made the proper factual findings
when it entered its initial order after the adjudicatory hearing. Judge
Peterson, concurring, distinguished the facts from Williams v. HRS"9
and added that he believed the better practice would be to place the
findings in order of the court or incorporate them by reference in later
orders."'
In Interest of D.G. and P.G.,2 °' the court did not find dependency
after a two-day hearing but withheld adjudication. The parent ap-
pealed by arguing that a finding of no dependency and a withholding of
adjudication of dependency are mutually exclusive. The appellate court
agreed relying upon Florida Statute chapter 39.409 which governs or-
ders of adjudication. 0  If the trial court wished to order the parents'
193. See 1990 Survey, supra note 7, at 1193.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 568 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199. 568 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
200. Hardy, 568 So. 2d at 1316.
201. 568 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
202. Id. FLA. STAT. § 39.405 (1989) provides:
(1) If the court finds that the child named in a petition is not dependent, it
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home placed under the supervision of HRS as a disposition, there must
have been a dependency finding with a decision that no other action
than home supervision was required. In this case, the finding of the
trial court was inconsistent with this order. Therefore, the appellate
court remanded.2 °3
Finally, in Interest of S.W., E.J. and L.M.,204 the issue was
whether a "single" incident allegation that on one day a mother repeat-
edly hit one of her children with a belt constituted abuse.205 The evi-
dence showed that the mother repeatedly hit the child with the belt,
that the child was taken to the Child Protection Team doctor under
contract with HRS later the same day, and that the physician found
evidence of recent bruises including some to the face which were con-
sistent with belt marks. The appellate court noted that the marks on
the face also might have been consistent with a fall which the mother
claimed the child suffered when the youngster ran away after the inci-
dent. 206 Significantly, no treatment was required for any of the child's
injuries. The appellate court reversed the finding of dependency as to
the child who was struck and two other siblings who, on the basis of the
language of the Florida statute, were at risk. The statute states that
"abuse means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or
sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause a child's physical, mental,
or emotional health to be significantly appear impaired." 07 The appel-
late court, after finding that the facts did not match the statutory defi-
nition, commented on the underlying events. Apparently, the mother
awoke to find one child attempting to feed a younger child a mixture of
bleach and baby oil. The mother then spanked the daughter for the
behavior.2 8 The court recognized that the reaction may have been ex-
cessive and that the mother may have been agitated. It found that
while it did not condone the reaction, the actions of the mother were
shall enter an order so finding and dismissing a case.
(2) If the court finds that the child named in a petition is dependent, but
finds that no action other than supervision in his own home is required, it
may enter an order briefly stating the facts upon which its finding is based,
but withholding an order of adjudication and placing the child's home
under supervision of the Department . . ..
203. D.G., 568 So. 2d at 1001.
204. 581 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
205. Id. at 235; see FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (Supp. 1990).
206. S.W., 581 So. 2d at 235.
207. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (1989) (emphasis added).
208. S.W., 581 So. 2d at 235.
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not sufficient to warrant a finding of dependency. 0 9
D. Child Abuse Reporting Issues
Mandatory reporting of child abuse and neglect is governed by
Florida Statute chapter 415.054.210 In addition to listing the persons
who must report suspected abuse or neglect, establishing a central
abuse registry and tracking system, establishing a procedure to investi-
gate the reports, the statute sets up certain due process procedures
whereby the alleged perpetrator may challenge the report.2 11 Two re-
cent cases involved such efforts.
In D.J. v. HRS,112 a parent appealed from a final order by HRS
denying a request to have her name expunged from the child abuse
registry. HRS investigated a report of child abuse involving appellant's
four-year-old son. An HRS investigator had seen a scratch on the
child's face and a bruise on the child's neck. The mother told the inves-
tigators two days earlier she had slapped the child for throwing objects
and not minding her. The appellate court overruled the hearing officer's
conclusions for several reasons. First, the officer did not make any spe-
cific findings of excessive corporal punishment as required by the
law.2 13 Second, the court rejected the hearing officer's finding that the
evidence created a rebuttable presumption of abuse. The court viewed
that standard as inconsistent with its own prior decision in B.R. v.
HRS.21 '4 The court took the position that whether corporal punishment
is excessive must be shown in each instance by "competent, substantial
evidence", and all relevant issues presented must be considered "with-
209. Id.
210. Child abuse reporting systems are required in states such as Florida that
receive funding under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (1988)). See Bessarov, Recognizing Child Abuse: A Guide for the
Concern (1990) (critically analyzing the child abuse reporting system in the United
States).
211. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.504(4)(c)l.a-j (1991).
212. 565 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
213. Id. at 863 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(a)1 (Supp. 1990)).
214. Id. (citing B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
B.L. v. HRS, 545 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). Significantly, the B.R.
case is contrary to a First District Court of Appeals opinion in B.L.. The court in B.R.
adopted the dissent in B.L. In B.L., the court held that there was no rational connection
between the length of time that a bruise remained visible and the ultimate fact of
excessive punishment.
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out resort to arbitrary presumptions fixed by the passage of time."2115
Finally, in M.O. Mc.C. v. HRS116 a stepmother of a child also
sought review of an HRS order which denied a request to expunge her
name from the child abuse registry. The court reversed because it also
found that there was no competent, substantial evidence to support the
hearing officer's conclusion that there was excessive corporal punish-
ment. However, in this case, the appellate court's reversal was based
solely on the fact it viewed the facts as not constituting excessive pun-
ishment. At issue was paddling of a step child pursuant to a code of
discipline which had been set up for the youngster by his father and
step mother with the aid of an outside professional. The court rejected
the significance of the fact that the paddle broke during the incident. It
had previously broken and had been repaired with common glue. The
court found no evidence of extraordinary force. The court disagreed
with the conclusion that the parent did not exercise sound judgment
and found no deviation by the parent from the code of discipline nor
that an inordinate number of hits were used.217
While the appellate cases in the dependency field often involve
horrific physical and psychological injury to children, occasionally a
case appears which demonstrates that not all claims are as they appear.
One such case is Interest of C.G. and C.B.218 C.G. complained of vagi-
nal irritation and her mother bought and applied an over-the-counter
ointment. Although the treatment appeared at first to be working,
when the irritation persisted for two weeks the mother took the child to
the doctor. The physician diagnosed trichomonas which is usually, but
not always, sexually transmitted. 219 The family cooperated with the
physician in reporting the diagnosis to HRS. Because the family was
215. B.R., 558 So. 2d at 1027, 1029.
216. 575 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
217. Id. at 1355. For a detailed summary of the legislative scheme for prevention
of abuse and neglect employing the state abuse registry, see B.R. v. HRS, 558 So. 2d
1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
218. 570 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
219. Trichomonal vaginitis is an infection of the vagina caused by Trichomonas,
a tiny one-celled organism. Symptoms of the infection are similar to those of yeast
infections . . ., and the two infections can occur together. However, the discharge of
trichomonas vaginitis is usually heavy, unpleasant smelling and greenish-yellow in
color. Trichomonal vaginitis is common and not thought to be dangerous, but it can be
irritating and painful. And because the disease is usually transmitted through sexual
intercourse, it is likely that the sexual partner also has it. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FAMILY MEDICAL GUIDE 602 (1982).
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anxious to learn what caused the infection, family members were tested
voluntarily with negative results. Then, they sought a second opinion by
taking the child to a board certified gynecologist, who disputed the di-
agnosis of trichomonas. HRS commenced a dependency proceeding
based on medical neglect. There were no allegations of sexual abuse.
The basis for the petition appeared to be the fourteen-day treatment
with an over-the-counter medication. Describing the evidence as bu-
reaucratic overkill, the Fourth District explained that the trial court
removed both children from their home including a child who was
never alleged to have been neglected. They were placed in foster care
for a long period of time. Upon returning the children to their home,
the juvenile court withheld adjudication of dependency and ordered
protective supervision of both children with a guardian ad litem and a
direction for family therapy.220 In what may best be described as an
understatement, the appellate court concluded, "surely seeking medical
attention when it appears that an over-the-counter medication is not
curing" without more "does not support a finding of child neglect and
the separation of children from their parents."22
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Padgett v. HRS 2 is a major decision by the Florida Supreme
Court. It holds that the prior termination of a parents' rights in one
child can support the severing of the parents' rights in another child.
Padgett was an appeal from a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision
which had initially certified the question of prospective abuse, neglect
or abandonment. 223 The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the question
to determine whether a prior termination as to one child could be used
to sever the parental rights to a different child.224
A review of the facts helps place the court's detailed legal analysis
and decision in context. The mother and father appealed from an order
terminating their parental rights to their child, W.L.P. Two years
before W.L.P. was born, five children born to the father during a previ-
ous marriage were committed to HRS for adoption. These children had
been found to be dependent based upon extreme neglect by the father
220. C.G., 570 So. 2d at 1137.
221. Id.
222. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
223. See Padgett v. HRS, 543 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
224. 577 So. 2d at 566.
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and his, prior wife. 225 The year before the birth of W.L.P., the mother
gave birth to a child that was promptly placed in HRS custody and was
permanently committed for adoption. It is unclear from the opinion
whether a finding of dependency was ever made as to this child. Two
days after W.L.P. was born, HRS filed a petition for detention of
W.L.P. and the court subsequently entered an order of dependency
finding both parents unfit.226 The parents and HRS signed a perform-
ance agreement which authorized the return of W.L.P. if the parents
could demonstrate sufficient parenting ability after undergoing psycho-
therapy and taking parenting classes.227 Although the opinion does not
say so, it would appear that the return of the children to the parents
became impossible and the agency then sought to terminate their pa-
rental rights. While the termination proceeding was pending, two addi-
tional events occurred. The mother staged a bizarre fake rape of herself
and sexually abused a four-year-old girl who was in her care. 228 The
circuit court entered an order permanently terminating parental rights
and freeing W.L.P. for adoption. The parents appealed claiming that
the statute did not allow for termination of parental rights based upon
prospective mistreatment, that such a test was speculative, that it in-
volved a fundamental liberty interest decision which must be left to the
legislature, and that under the facts the evidence was insufficient to
make a finding of prospective neglect.229
The Florida Supreme Court refocused the issue on whether the
prior termination of parental rights in other children could serve as
grounds for permanently severing rights in the present child. It cor-
rectly sought to answer the question based both on statutory and con-
stitutional grounds. First, it held that the Florida Juvenile Justice Act
provides. statutory authority for this kind of decision. The court pointed
to chapter 39.464 which, until it was amended in 1990, provided that
termination of parental rights could be based upon severe or continuous
abuse or neglect of the child before the court "or other children. 230
225. Id.
226. Id. at 567.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 568.
229. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 568.
230. Id. at 569 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (1987)). Entitled Elements of Proce-
dure for Termination, this section provides in relevant part:
(2) Extraordinary Procedures.
(a) Whenever it appears that the manifest best interests of the child de-
mand it, the state may petition for termination of parental rights without
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The court next held that prior case law employed public policy
grounds to uphold the practice of terminating parental rights based
upon evidence of neglect of children other than the one before the
court .23  The public policy rationale rejects the requirement that a
child suffer actual abuse or neglect before it can be permanently re-
moved from a caretaker who has seriously mistreated others and cannot
be rehabilitated.3
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court held that the practice does not
violate the constitutionally protected liberty interests of the natural
parents. The court was clear, however, in its assertion that the parents'
familial interest, which includes raising children free from control by
the state, is both long-standing and fundamental. 33 The balance to be
struck, according to the Florida Supreme Court, is in favor of the
child's "entitlement to an environment free of physical and emotional
violence at the hands of his or her most trusted caretaker."2 3"' The
court found that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
offering a performance agreement or permanent placement plan to the
parents ....
(b) The state may petition under this subsection only under the following
circumstances:
2. Severe or continuous abuse or neglect of the child or other children by
the parent that demonstrates that the parent's conduct threatens the life or
well-being of the child regardless of the provision of services as evidenced
by having had services provided through a previous performance agree-
ment or permanent placement plan.
This statutory section has since been amended but still includes the provision for termi-
nating parental rights based upon abuse or neglect of other children. That section reads
as follows:
(3) Severe or Continuing Abuse or Neglect.
The parent or parents have engaged in conduct towards the child or to-
wards other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of
the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life or
well-being of the child regardless of the provisions of services. Provision of
services is evidenced by having had services provided through a previous
performance agreement, permanent placement plan, or offer of services in
the nature of a case plan from a child welfare agency. A current perform-
ance agreement or placement plan need not be offered to the parent or
parents, and the petition may be filed at any time before a performance
agreement or permanent placement plan has been accepted by the court.
231. Id. at 569-70.
232. Id. at 570.
233. Id.
234. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 570.
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children against clear threats of abuse, neglect or death. The court then
set up a multi-part test for termination based upon evidence of abuse or
neglect of other children. First, the state must make a showing by clear
and convincing evidence. Second, it must show that reunification with
the parent "poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. 23 5
Third, -the evidence may be abuse or neglect of a different child.
Fourth, termination of parents' liberty based rights to their children
must be the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious
harm. Fifth, in most cases HRS must show its good faith effort to reha-
bilitate the parents and reunite the family through a performance
agreement or other plan for the present child.2 36 Sixth, lack of financial
resources cannot support permanent termination of parental rights.13 7
Finally, the parent's intelligence is ordinarily not relevant to the
inquiry.2 38
Padgett is defensible as a matter of statutory analysis, public pol-
icy, and constitutional law. The termination statute can properly be
read to allow for a transfer of neglect such that the neglect of one child
will serve as the basis for neglect of a second. Public policy historically
obligates the state, as parens patriae, to protect the interests of chil-
dren. That protection, when balanced against constitutional rights of
familial integrity, weighs in the favor of protecting the rights of chil-
dren over those of parents, but only when there is compelling need to
do so.239 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court's test for the grounds under
which the termination can occur, strikes a proper balance between the
interests of parents and children.
There are, however, two problems with the opinion. One is more
significant than the other. First, by reframing the question to be
whether neglect of one child can form the basis for termination of pa-
rental rights to another, the court fails to fully acknowledge and defend
the fact that it is still upholding the right of the trial court to predict
that neglect will occur in the future. Of course, Padgett is not a case
where there is evidence of either present or past neglect of the child
before the court and the court is faced with deciding whether it will
occur in the future. Rather, the court is allowing the fact finder to
decide whether a particular child will be abused and neglected in the
235. Id. at 571.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464(5) (Supp. 1990)).
238. /d.
239. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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future based upon evidence of abuse of another child in the past. That
is still clearly a predictive process. The supreme court should acknowl-
edge it as such and justify it.2" 0 Second, on a more technical level, the
supreme court might have employed different phraseology describing
this kind of decision-making as involving "transferred neglect." Such
language more precisely defines what the supreme court was holding.
Padgett demonstrates the serious nature of termination proceed-
ings. Among the other elements necessary to be proven at a termination
of parental rights hearing is that the parent was informed of his or her
right to counsel in the dependency proceedings." 1 In Belflower v.
HRS,4 2 the appellate court reversed the finding of termination of pa-
rental rights based upon the clear failure of proof as to advising the
parents of their right to counsel at the dependency proceeding. How-
ever, Belflower is significant because it also held that, even when a peti-
tion for termination of parental rights is denied, the court may still
decide whether the child shall remain in foster care or be returned to
the parent with or without protective supervision.24 The justification
for such consideration is the best interest of the child.2"4 Furthermore,
in that particular case, because the parent failed to appeal from the
adjudication of dependency within thirty days as provided by Florida
law, 2" the adjudication of dependency remained standing although it
was not a valid basis for termination of parental rights.2"6 Thus, the
trial court also had continuing jurisdiction in light of the outstanding
dependency adjudication to decide whether the youngster required fur-
ther supervision or foster care or might be safely returned home.24
In dicta which seems at odds with the Florida statute, the appel-
late court commented that because there was no fundamental constitu-
tional right to counsel at a dependency proceeding, the underlying de-
pendency adjudication is not void ab initio for failure to advise the
240. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); (upholding the right to predict
future behavior in the context of pre-trial detention of juveniles and adults as not viola-
tive of the individual's constitutionally based liberty interests).
241. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(3)(c)1 (Supp. 1990).
242. 578 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
243. Id. at 828 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.468(2) (Supp. 1990)).
244. Id.
245. See FLA. STAT. § 39.413 (Supp. 1990); In re D.M.S., 528 So. 2d 505 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
246. Belflower, 578 So. 2d at 829.
247. Id. at 828.
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parents of their right to counsel.2 4 8 The problem with the court's asser-
tion is that the second proposition does not follow from the first. Flor-
ida, by statute, requires that the parents be advised of the right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding. 49 What the Florida law does not
provide is the appointment of counsel if the parent is indigent. Thus, if
the court and HRS fail to advise the parent of his or her right to coun-
sel in a dependency proceeding, even though the parent may have to
pay for the lawyer, if the parent appeals in a timely fashion, the adjudi-
cation of dependency will fall. This is not a matter of constitutional law
but a matter of compliance with the Florida statute. Although the dicta
is suspect, the court in Belflower was correct in holding that a depen-
dency proceeding is not void ab initio when a parent is not advised of
the right to counsel in a dependency proceeding. It remains up to the
parent to challenge that failure on appeal. Finally, the right to counsel
free of charge for a parent in a dependency proceeding under Florida
law is to be determined on a case by case basis employing the test the
Supreme Court set out in Potvin v. Keller.2 60
The important question of what individual may commence a pro-
ceeding to terminate parental rights was raised recently in Norris v.
Spencer."' A child had been placed in the care of the appellant care-
takers by the child's natural mother. The child was subsequently de-
clared dependent and the caretakers were appointed custodians of the
child. The natural mother entered into a case plan with HRS and then
asked the court to return custody of the child. The parents' motion was
denied and thereafter, the custodians filed a petition for severance of
parental rights. The mother moved to dismiss252 on grounds that the
custodians lacked standing to commence termination of parental rights
proceedings. The motion was granted and the custodians appealed. The
appellate court held that HRS is not the only party entitled to bring a
petition for termination of parental rights. In fact, the court stated that
the ability to protect a child from unreasonable action or inaction by
248. Id. at 829.
249. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
250. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975). In Potvin, the Florida Supreme Court set up a
five-part test to determine whether a parent should be provided with counsel in a de-
pendency proceeding. They are: (1) the potential length of the parent/child separation;
(2) the degree of parental restriction on visitation; (3) the presence or absence of pa-
rental consent; (4) the presence or absence of disputed facts; (5) and the complexity of
the proceedings in terms of witnesses and documents.
251. 568 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
252. Id. at 1317.
Dale
41
Dale: Juvenile Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
HRS is facilitated by the ability of third parties to commence petitions
to terminate parental rights. It therefore reversed.253
V. CONCLUSION
The appellate courts seem to have had little difficulty in interpret-
ing the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1990 in the cases that have
come before them. The appellate courts continue to express concern
about the legislature's failure to properly fund delinquency programs.
And the appellate courts continue to upbraid the trial courts for their
failure to comply with basic statutory applications, both in the delin-
quency and dependency areas. It remains to be seen whether the trial
courts will at long last listen to appellate judges. Padgett is a major
decision by the Florida Supreme Court in the dependency field, having
finally answered the question of what constitutes prospective or trans-
ferred neglect and how it should be tested. While the decision may not
be quite as precise as it could be, it does resolve the issue in this
jurisdiction.
253. Id.; see also Interest of C.B., 561 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Interest of J.M., 569 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Interest of J.R.T.,
427 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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